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CAUGHT IN A WEB OF LIES: USE OF PRIOR 
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS TO 
IMPEACH WITNESSES BEFORE THE ICTY 
Elizabeth M. DiPardo* 
Abstract: Trial attorneys around the world face the problem of how to 
confront a witness whose live testimony contradicts his prior statements. 
U.S. prosecutors take refuge under Federal Rule of Evidence 613 and 
the Harris doctrine, which permit inadmissible hearsay and illegally ob-
tained statements to be used to impeach a witness’s live testimony. No 
similar rule aids prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Recent divergent decisions regarding the 
use of inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes have left ICTY 
prosecutors struggling to prove cases against the most heinous criminals 
in history. This Note argues that the ICTY should adopt a new eviden-
tiary rule akin to the United States’ Rule 613 and the Harris doctrine. 
Adoption of a new rule would more efficiently balance the prosecutor’s 
duty to prove the case against the accused’s right not to be convicted by 
otherwise inadmissible evidence. 
The question is whether you were lying then or are you lying now . . . or 
whether in fact you are a habitual and compulsive liar! 
—Agatha Christie’s Witness for the Prosecution 
Introduction 
 With the dramatic flair that only movies can muster, Agatha Christie’s 
character Sir Wilfrid Robarts highlights a classic problem facing trial 
attorneys: how does an attorney confront a witness whose live testimony 
contradicts his prior statements?1 
 U.S. prosecutors take for granted the evidentiary proposition that 
inadmissible hearsay and illegally obtained statements are always avail-
able to impeach a witness’s live testimony should he weave a web of lies 
                                                                                                                      
* Elizabeth M. DiPardo is the Managing Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 Witness for the Prosecution (MGM 1957). 
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on the stand.2 In stark contrast, the use of prior inconsistent statements 
for impeachment purposes before the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) varies from case to case.3 In an inter-
national criminal system, where there are few evidentiary rules and lit-
tle precedent to draw on, these divergent decisions leave ICTY prosecu-
tors struggling to prove cases against the most heinous criminals in 
history.4 
 Part I of this Note focuses on both the development of the ICTY’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the particular rules governing the 
admission of evidence at trial. Part II examines particular examples of 
the admission of prior inconsistent statements before the ICTY, com-
mon law courts, and civil law courts. Part III argues that the ICTY 
should adopt the logic of U.S. courts and codify a rule allowing other-
wise inadmissible evidence to be used for impeachment purposes. 
I. Background 
A. Establishment of the ICTY’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure 
 The ICTY opened its doors in 1993 as an ad-hoc court and body of 
the United Nations (U.N.) designed to try crimes committed in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia.5 The ICTY exercises jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                      
2 See generally Fed. R. Evid. 613 (authorizing impeachment by prior inconsistent state-
ments, even if statement is otherwise inadmissible hearsay); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222 (1971) (allowing impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, even if statement was 
obtained in violation of witness’s constitutional rights). 
3 Compare Prosecutor v. Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use 
of Statements Given by the Accused, ¶ 33 (Oct. 9, 2006) (allowing use of prior inconsistent 
statements for impeachment), with Prosecutor v. SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for 
Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use Telephone Interviews, ¶ 8 (Mar. 11, 2003) (refus-
ing to admit prior inconsistent statements for impeachment). 
4 Gideon Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: The ICTY and the 
Principle of Flexibility, 12 Crim. L.F. 41, 41–42 (2001). 
5 See S.C. Res. 827, ¶¶ 6–7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing an in-
ternational tribunal); S.C. Res. 808, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (deciding, 
in principle, to form an international criminal tribunal to address crimes that occurred in 
former Yugoslavia). The exigent need for an international criminal tribunal was apparent 
in the spirited speeches given before the U.N. Security Council. Ambassador Madeline 
Albright proclaimed: 
There is an echo in this Chamber today. . . . We have preserved the long-
neglected compact made by the community of civilized nations [forty-eight] 
years ago in San Francisco to create the United Nations and enforce the Nur-
emberg Principles. The lesson that we are all accountable to international law 
may have finally taken hold in our collective memory. This will be no victor’s 
tribunal. The only victor that will prevail in this endeavor is the truth. 
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individuals responsible for violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
violations of the law of war or genocide, and other crimes against hu-
manity.6 To achieve this task, the U.N. Security Council left the ar-
rangement of all practical details to the U.N. Secretary-General.7 
 Recognizing that little precedent existed regarding the day-to-day 
operation of an international criminal tribunal, the Secretary-General 
concluded that “the judges of the International Tribunal as a whole 
should draft and adopt rules of procedure and evidence.”8 Two months 
of drafting gave rise to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules).9 This 
document, in just 125 rules, outlined the procedural framework includ-
ing investigatory procedures; pre-trial, trial, and appellate proceedings; 
sentencing; and all rules of evidence.10 
 The simplicity of the Rules is rooted in the historical purpose and 
development of the ICTY.11 The ICTY embraces the straightforward 
goal of “ensur[ing] that a trial is fair and expeditious . . . with full re-
spect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of 
victims and witnesses.”12 Flexible procedures give the Trial Chamber 
discretion to decide what is in the best interest of the accused on a case-
by-case basis.13 The ICTY also represents an attempt to integrate the civil 
                                                                                                                      
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3175 (Feb. 22, 1993), reprinted in 2 
Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 165 (1995). 
6 Statute of the International Tribunal, 32 I.L.M. 1192, available at http://www.icls.de/ 
dokumente/icty_statut.pdf, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, supra note 5 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
7 S.C. Res. 827, supra note 5, ¶ 8. 
8 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), ¶ 83, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), reprinted in Morris & 
Scharf, supra note 5, at 19. 
9 Michael P. Scharf, Balkan Justice 67 (1997). 
10 Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 
1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICTY Doc. IT/32/Rev.3 (Feb. 6, 1995), reprinted in 
ABA, Report on the Proposed Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Interna-
tional Tribunal to Adjudicate War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia 4–54 (Karen 
Tucker ed., 1995); see also Scharf, supra note 9, at 70 (noting that despite brevity of Rules, 
they represent a marked improvement over Nuremberg Tribunal’s operating rules, which 
allowed for trials in absentia, denied defense counsel access to evidentiary archives, often 
compelled defendants into making incriminating statements against themselves, and pro-
hibited appeals of adverse decisions). 
11 See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 5, ¶¶ 6–7; S.C. Res. 808, supra note 5, ¶ 9. 
12 ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 20(1). 
13 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Re-
questing Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ¶ 23 (Aug. 10, 1995) (“A final 
indication of the uniqueness of the International Tribunal is that, as an ad hoc institution, 
the International Tribunal was able to mold its Rules and procedures to fit the task at 
hand.”). 
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and common law heritages of all U.N. members.14 The Rules, therefore, 
embody only those principles espoused by all member states.15 
 The judges drafting the Rules cleverly left the power to amend any 
and all procedural rules in their own hands.16 The drafters were aware 
that, because the Rules were the first international code of criminal 
procedure, they would need to be adjusted to meet the practical needs 
of international criminal prosecution.17 Amendment of a rule occurs 
when a judge, prosecutor, or registrar proposes a change, which gar-
ners support from ten of the sixteen permanent judges at the annual 
plenary meeting or obtains unanimous support of the permanent 
judges at any time.18 The judges of the ICTY have embraced this power 
wholeheartedly as the Rules have been amended, on average, twice per 
year since their adoption in 1994.19 Recent studies of the Rules note 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Prosecutor v. DelaliG, Case No. IT-96–21-T, Decision on the Motion on Presenta-
tion of Evidence by the Accused, Esad Landzo, ¶ 15 (May 1, 1997) (“[I]n formulating the 
rules, elements of both the civil and the common law systems capable of promoting justice 
were considered and adopted. . . . A Rule may have a common law or civilian origin but 
the final product may be an amalgam of both common law and civilian elements, so as to 
render it sui generis.”). 
15 See The President of the International Tribunal, First Annual Report of the International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitar-
ian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 53, delivered to the Security 
Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1007, A/49/342 (Aug. 29, 1994), available 
at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/1994/index.htm [hereinafter First Annual Report] 
(noting that “only measures on which there is broad agreement have been adopted, thus 
reflecting concepts that are generally recognized as being fair and just in the international 
arena”). 
16 See Int’l Criminal Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of Int’l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo. Since 
1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 6 (Amendment of the Rules), ICTY Doc. 
IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 22, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/ 
IT032Rev38e.pdf [hereinafter R. P. & Evid.]; see also Gideon Boas, A Code of Evidence and 
Procedure for International Criminal Law? The Rules of the ICTY, in International Criminal 
Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY 10 (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas 
eds., 2003) (“Even though there are clearly times when the interpretative role of a judge 
exceeds the simple application of the law and may be perceived as a form of judicial legis-
lating, generally the doctrine [of separation of powers] prevents any substantial interfer-
ence of the judiciary on this task.”). 
17 Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, 
Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 725, 735 (1999). 
18 R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 6(A)–(B) (Amendment of the Rules). For a listing of 
the current make-up of the ICTY, see ICTY Key Figures, available at http://www.un.org/icty/ 
glance/keyfig-e.htm (last visited May 12, 2008). 
19 See Boas, supra note 16, at 5 (explaining the remarkable number of amendments 
that have been made to Rules since their initial adoption). 
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that, between 2000 and 2001, ninety-one rules were amended, seven 
new rules were adopted, and one rule was deleted.20 
B. Admission of Evidence Under the ICTY’s Rules 
 Only two broad principles guide a judge’s hand when admitting 
evidence before the ICTY: (1) Trial Chambers “may admit any relevant 
evidence which it deems to have probative value,”21 and (2) “may ex-
clude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
need to ensure a fair trial.”22 The simplicity of these provisions reflects 
that the common law’s restrictive evidentiary rules stem from the need 
to control information presented to a lay jury.23 As ICTY judges serve as 
the factfinder at trial, these skilled jurists can weigh the probative value 
of evidence without being “shielded from irrelevancies or given guid-
ance as to the weight of the evidence they have heard.”24 The admission 
of evidence before the ICTY thus mirrors the inquisitorial model of 
civil law nations.25 
 Inherent in the determination of whether evidence is probative is 
the reliability of the evidence.26 Although the Trial Chambers have re-
fused to read an absolute requirement of reliability as a condition for 
admissibility, reliability is “the golden thread which runs through all 
components of admissibility.”27 
                                                                                                                      
20 Id. 
21 R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 89(C) (General Provisions). 
22 Id. at 89(D)(General Provisions). 
23 See First Annual Report, supra note 15, ¶ 72 (remarking that there are no technical 
evidentiary rules because “[t]his Tribunal does not need to shackle itself to restrictive rules 
which have developed out of the ancient trial-by-jury system”). 
24 See id.; see also Fed. Judicial Ctr., Manual For Complex Litigation (Fourth) 
§ 11.431 (2004) (stating that judges are “accustomed to reviewing matters that may not be 
admissible”). 
25 See Boas, supra note 4, at 48 (comparing ICTY’s flexible approach to admission of 
evidence to principle of la liberté de la prevue present in French criminal law system, 
which allows a court to rule any form of evidence admissible). 
26 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95–14/2-AR73.5, Decision on Appeal Re-
garding Statement of a Deceased Witness, ¶¶ 23, 24, & 29 ( July 21, 2000) (concluding that 
decedent’s unsworn statement that had not been taken subject to cross-examination was 
unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible); Prosecutor v. Alexsovski, Case No. IT-95–14/1-
AR73, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, ¶ 15 (Feb. 16, 
1999) (“Trial Chambers have a broad discretion under Rule 89(C) to admit relevant hear-
say evidence. Since such evidence is admitted to prove the truth of its contents, a Trial 
Chamber must be satisfied that it is reliable for that purpose in the sense of being volun-
tary, truthful and trustworthy.”). 
27 Prosecutor v. DelaliG, Case No. IT-98–21-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Oral Re-
quest for the Admission of Exhibit 155 into Evidence and for an Order to Compel the 
Accused, Zdravko Mucic, to Provide a Handwriting Sample, ¶ 32 ( Jan. 19, 1998); see Wil-
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1. Admission of Hearsay Evidence 
 The ICTY defines hearsay as “the statement of a person made oth-
erwise than in the proceedings in which it is being tendered, but never-
theless being tendered in those proceedings in order to establish the 
truth of what the person says.”28 Hearsay statements are admissible 
against both parties if the statements are relevant and have probative 
value.29 The Rules not only allow for the admission of hearsay evidence, 
but specifically call for the use of written statements in lieu of live testi-
mony to expedite trials.30 
 Only when the need to ensure a fair trial outweighs the probative 
value will Rule 89(D) filter out hearsay statements.31 The “golden 
thread” of reliability, therefore, weaves into this analysis because deter-
minations regarding probative value require Trial Chambers to pay par-
ticular attention to the reliability of a statement including whether it 
was voluntary, truthful, and trustworthy.32 
 The adoption of this flexible approach to hearsay evidence reflects 
that, in legal systems around the world, “[t]he exclusion . . . of hearsay 
evidence is not grounded upon its intrinsic lack of probative value. It is 
ordinarily excluded because of the possible infirmities with respect to 
the observation, memory, narration, and veracity of him who utters the 
offered words.”33 
2. Admission of Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Rules 
 Evidence obtained in violation of the Rules’ procedural safeguards 
is not automatically excluded because of the ICTY’s flexible approach 
to the admission of evidence.34 In Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, the Trial 
                                                                                                                      
liam A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals 456 (2006) (discussing 
importance of reliability in admission of evidence before ICTY). 
28 Alexsovski, Case No. IT-95–14/1-AR73, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Appeal on Ad-
missibility of Evidence, ¶ 14. 
29 See id. ¶ 15. 
30 R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 92 bis (Admission of Written Statements and Tran-
scripts in Lieu of Oral Testimony). 
31 Boas, supra note 16, at 29 (explaining reasons why hearsay evidence will be excluded 
in trials before ICTY). 
32 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94–1-T, Decision on the Defense Motion on Hear-
say, ¶¶ 15–19 (Aug. 7, 1996), quoted in Boas, supra note 4, at 51–52. 
33 Int’l Military Trib. for the Far East, Judgment ( July 25, 1946) (Pal, J., dissenting), 
quoted in May & Wierda, supra note 17, at 745. 
34 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 5(A) (Non-compliance with the Rules) (“When an 
objection on the ground of non-compliance with the Rules or Regulations is raised by a 
party at the earliest opportunity, the Trial Chamber shall grant relief if it finds that the 
alleged non-compliance has caused material prejudice to that party.”); Prosecutor v. 
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Chamber noted that “drafters of the Rules specifically chose not to set 
out a rule providing for the automatic exclusion of evidence illegally or 
unlawfully obtained.”35 Instead, relevant and probative evidence is gen-
erally admissible unless it was “obtained by methods which cast substan-
tial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and 
would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.”36 
 The defense successfully invoked this exclusionary principle in 
Prosecutor v. DelaliG.37 There, the Trial Chamber excluded a confession 
that Austrian police obtained after hours of continuous interrogation, 
by five different officers, and repeated assertions that the accused’s con-
fession would mitigate the severity of the charges.38 In making its de-
termination, the Trial Chamber noted that any statements obtained by 
oppressive conduct undermined the integrity of the proceedings.39 In 
Prosecutor v. KordiG, however, evidence obtained by eavesdropping on an 
enemy’s telephone calls in a time of war did not damage the integrity of 
the proceedings and was thus admissible at trial.40 
3. Cross-Examination of Witnesses 
 The Rules expressly guarantee litigants the right to cross-examine 
witnesses.41 The sequence of witness examinations in ICTY proceedings 
parallels the system used in common law courts: the prosecution pre-
sents its witnesses and engages in direct examination, after which the 
defense counsel may cross-examine the witnesses.42 Notably, the subject 
matter on cross-examination is limited to the evidence-in-chief and 
matters substantially affecting the credibility of witnesses.43 
                                                                                                                      
Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Prosecution’s Response to the Joint Defense Submission in 
Respect of the Prosecution’s Request for the Use of the Statements of the Accused Given 
Before National Organs in the Course of those Proceedings, ¶ 15 (Sept. 15, 2006) [here-
inafter Mrk»iG Brief for the Prosecution]. 
35 Case No. IT-99–36-T, Decision on the Defence “Objection to Intercept Evidence,” 
¶ 54 (Oct. 3, 2003). 
36 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 95 (Exclusion of Certain Evidence). 
37 See Case No. IT-96–21, Decision on Zdravko Mucic’s Motion for the Exclusion of Evi-
dence (Sept. 2, 1997). 
38 Id. ¶¶ 13–15. 
39 See id. ¶ 41. 
40 Case No. IT-95–14/2-T, Oral Decision of Feb. 2, 2000, quoted in Brdjanin, Case No. 
IT-99–36-T, Decision on the Defence “Objection to Intercept Evidence,” n.23. 
41 R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 90(H)(i) (Testimony of Witnesses). 
42 See First Annual Report, supra note 15, ¶ 65; see also Scharf, supra note 9, at 69 (ex-
plaining the procedure followed by the ICTY during trials). 
43 R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 90(H)(i) (Testimony of Witnesses). 
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 The right to cross-examination is traditionally linked to preserving 
the right of an accused to confront witnesses testifying against him.44 
Recent decisions by the Trial Chambers, however, note that both the 
prosecution and the defense must have the right to engage in effective 
cross-examination to ensure a fair trial.45 For example, in Prosecutor v. 
Blaskic, the defense provided the prosecution with only pseudonyms 
representing two key witnesses and refused to provide any additional 
information until the moment the witnesses appeared to testify.46 The 
defense counsel sought to insulate these witnesses from outside pres-
sure.47 In finding for the prosecution, the Trial Chamber concluded 
that this withholding of information interfered with the prosecution’s 
right to effective cross-examination of defense witnesses.48 The Trial 
Chamber, therefore, ordered defense counsel to provide the prosecu-
tion with the witnesses’ full names and summaries of the facts to which 
each would testify two days before the scheduled testimony.49 
II. Discussion 
 The right to cross-examine a witness regarding his or her credibil-
ity must include the right to present prior inconsistent statements to a 
witness if, during live testimony, the witness changes his or her story.50 
The prosecutor’s ability to introduce this form of impeachment evi-
dence, however, is not explicitly guaranteed in the Rules and, therefore, 
is left entirely to the discretion of each Trial Chamber.51 
                                                                                                                      
44 See generally Stefano Maffei, The European Right to Confrontation in Crimi-
nal Proceedings (2006) (concluding that confrontation of adverse witnesses is a funda-
mental right of accused after tracing development of right in English, Italian, and French 
criminal procedure). 
45 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95–14, Decision on the Defence Motion for Pro-
tective Measures for Witnesses D/H and D/I, ¶ 10 (Sept. 25, 1998) (“CONSIDERING that, 
in view of establishing the truth, this principle requires that there be no excessive in-
fringement on the rights of the Prosecution, inter alia the right to conduct an effective 
cross-examination of the Defence witnesses.”). 
46 Id. ¶ 8. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. ¶¶ 10, 14. 
49 Id. ¶ 14. 
50 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 90(H)(i) (Testimony of Witnesses) (granting liti-
gants the right to cross-examine on matters affecting the credibility of witnesses). 
51 Compare Prosecutor v. Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use 
of Statements Given by the Accused, ¶ 33 (Oct. 9, 2006) (allowing impeachment by prior 
inconsistent statements), with Prosecutor v. SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Deci-
sion on Prosecution’s Motion to Use Telephone Interviews, ¶ 8 (Mar. 11, 2003) (refusing 
to allow impeachment by prior inconsistent statements). 
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A. Use of Impeachment Evidence Before the ICTY 
1. Impeachment Evidence in Prosecutor v. SimiG 
 For more than three years, Blagoje SimiG, Miroslav TadiG, and 
Simo ZariG, together with the Serbian military, wreaked havoc on the 
municipality of Bosanski Samac.52 Under their “campaign of terror,” 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats were required to work at forced labor pro-
jects; expelled, through force and intimidation, from their homes; or 
sent to detention camps where prisoners were killed, beaten, and sexu-
ally assaulted.53 By the end of the conflict, the Muslim and Croat popu-
lations had dwindled from 17,000 in 1991 to less than 300 in 1995.54 
These actions constituted crimes against humanity and contravened the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, leading the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor to 
indict all three men in 1995.55 
 At trial, a novel issue of international evidentiary law emerged re-
garding the use of a witness’s prior inconsistent statements to impeach 
his testimony.56 The prosecutor had conducted three telephone inter-
views with TadiG in 1996.57 When TadiG’s live testimony conflicted with 
his interview statements, the prosecution sought to cross-examine him 
regarding these inconsistencies.58 To prevent the admission of these 
statements, the defense argued that, at the time of the interviews, the 
accused was not fully aware of the nature and cause of the charges 
against him.59 These statements were therefore obtained in violation of 
the accused’s rights under the Rules.60 The prosecution urged the Trial 
Chamber to adopt the logic of Harris v. New York, a seminal U.S. deci-
                                                                                                                      
52 See Prosecutor v. SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9, Fifth Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 11–33 
(May 30, 2002) [hereinafter SimiG Fifth Amended Indictment]. 
53 Prosecutor v. SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9, Indictment, ¶¶ 4–5 ( July 21, 1995). 
54 Id. ¶ 1. 
55 Id. ¶ 34. 
56 See SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use 
Telephone Interviews, ¶ 2. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 42 (Rights of Suspect During Investigation) (“(A) 
A suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor shall have the following rights, of 
which the Prosecutor shall inform the suspect prior to questioning, in a language the sus-
pect understands: (i) the right to be assisted by counsel of the suspect’s choice or to be 
assigned legal assistance without payment if the suspect does not have sufficient means to 
pay for it; (ii) the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if the suspect cannot 
understand or speak the language to be used for questioning; and (iii) the right to remain 
silent, and to be cautioned that any statement the suspect makes shall be recorded and 
may be used in evidence.”). 
286 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:277 
sion, which allows evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s con-
stitutional rights to be used for impeachment purposes.61 
 Trial Chamber II refused to admit these statements because admis-
sion would impede the ICTY’s mission to afford the accused a fair 
trial.62 First, the Trial Chamber feared that impeaching the accused’s 
credibility would affect issues of criminal responsibility.63 Second, the 
Rules’ procedural safeguards were designed to preserve the accused’s 
privilege against self-incrimination.64 When TadiG consented to these 
telephone interviews, the prosecutor had not yet served the indictment 
against him and, therefore, he was not aware of his privilege against 
self-incrimination.65 The Trial Chamber also feared that the use of 
these statements—even for impeachment purposes—would condone 
the prosecutor’s misconduct.66 The Rules also confer the right to ap-
pear as a witness in one’s own defense.67 The Trial Chamber reasoned 
that, if these statements undermined the accused’s credibility at trial, 
the accused could no longer assist in his own defense.68 
 The Trial Chamber refused to adopt the U.S. approach to im-
peachment evidence because of a factual difference between Harris and 
SimiG.69 To the Trial Chamber, a crucial difference was that the defen-
dant in Harris gave his statement before being indicted, whereas TadiG 
made a statement without fully being informed of the charges against 
him.70 
                                                                                                                      
61 SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use 
Telephone Interviews, ¶ 1. 
62 See id. ¶ 8 (concluding that “it is improper to allow the use of such evidence even for 
the purposes of impeaching the credibility of the accused, doing so would not be in accor-
dance with principles of fundamental justice”); see also ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 
20(1) (ensuring defendants the right to fair and expeditious trial). 
63 SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use 
Telephone Interviews, ¶ 8. 
64 Id. ¶ 6; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 21(4)(g) (stating that accused shall 
“not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt”). 
65 See SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use 
Telephone Interviews, ¶ 8. 
66 See id. 
67 R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 85(C) (Presentation of Evidence). 
68 SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use 
Telephone Interviews, ¶ 7. 
69 Id. ¶ 4. 
70 Id. 
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2.  Impeachment Evidence in Prosecutor v. Mrk»iG 
 Mile Mrk»iG, a former Colonel in the Yugoslav People’s Army 
( JNA), along with his subordinates Miroslav RadiG and Veselin ¼lji-
canIanin, were indicted for orchestrating the Vukovar massacre.71 On 
November 19, 1991, JNA soldiers transferred approximately 400 non-
Serbs from the Vukovar Hospital to a farm in Ovcara.72 These ill patients 
were beaten for several hours before being led to a field to be executed 
and buried in a mass grave.73 
 Just as in SimiG, Trial Chamber II faced the question as to whether 
the prosecution, during cross-examination, should be allowed to intro-
duce the accuseds’ prior inconsistent statements in order to challenge 
their credibility and the credibility of other defense witnesses.74 Mrk»iG 
and the other defendants had been questioned by the authorities of 
the former Yugoslavia in Belgrade in 1998.75 Defense counsel passion-
ately argued that these statements were inadmissible because this ques-
tioning was done in violation of the procedural safeguards laid out in 
Rule 37(B).76 Under the Rules, investigatory power may be wielded only 
by the Office of the Prosecutor and those acting under its discretion.77 
The statements at issue were taken by the Serbian military security or-
gan or the Military Investigating Judge at the instigation of the Military 
Prosecutor in Belgrade—an entity distinct from the ICTY.78 
 Over the defense’s objections, the Trial Chamber admitted the 
defendants’ 1998 statements solely for the purpose of cross-exam-
ination and testing the credibility of the witnesses’ testimony.79 This 
decision rested on several considerations including: the statements 
were obtained in accordance with Serbian domestic law;80 there was no 
                                                                                                                      
71 Prosecutor v. Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1, Second Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 18–29 
(Aug. 28, 2002). 
72 Id. ¶ 22. 
73 Tamara Kovacevic, Profile: The ‘Vukovar Three,’ BBC News, Mar. 9, 2004, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/1937767.stm. 
74 Prosecutor v. Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of 
Statements Given by the Accused, ¶ 30 (Oct. 9, 2006). 
75 Id. ¶ 15. 
76 Id. ¶¶ 11–13. 
77 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 37(B) (Functions of the Prosecutor) (“The Prose-
cutor’s powers and duties under the Rules may be exercised by staff members of the Office 
of the Prosecutor authorised by the Prosecutor, or by any person acting under the Prosecu-
tor’s discretion.”). 
78 Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements Given by 
the Accused, ¶ 15. 
79 Id. ¶ 33. 
80 Id. ¶ 17. 
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suggestion that the accuseds’ wills were overborne or influenced by co-
ercion, inducement, or other impropriety;81 and the 1998 statements 
were obtained much closer in time to the actual events than the state-
ments given at trial in 2006.82 Judge Parker, moreover, concluded that 
the integrity of the proceedings could be open to greater 
threat if an Accused was not tested in cross-examination about 
an earlier account he had given which was materially inconsis-
tent with his evidence given in the trial. That is so whether, for 
example, the inconsistency is explicable by confusion or lapse 
of memory given the years since the events, or to deliberate 
falsity of the evidence given at trial. . . . In the latter case, the 
Trial Chamber may be misled by perjury concerning a mate-
rial matter.83 
 Judge Parker also noted that allowing impeachment of a witness 
would unearth evidence of substantial probative value regarding the 
credibility of all evidence given by the witness.84 Discovery of additional 
probative information furthers the ICTY’s mission to ensure a fair 
trial.85 
 Although the Trial Chamber admitted these 1998 statements to im-
peach the declarant, the Trial Chamber refused to admit these state-
ments to challenge the testimony of other defense witnesses.86 To im-
peach a witness with another’s prior statements would not yield evidence 
of significant probative value because no one, except the declarant, 
would be in a position to explain the inconsistencies.87 
B. Use of Impeachment Evidence in the United States 
 In U.S. courts, a defendant’s credibility may be challenged by prior 
inconsistent statements, even when the statements are inadmissible as 
evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief because of a procedural or 
                                                                                                                      
81 Id. ¶ 28. 
82 Id. 
83 Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements Given by 
the Accused, ¶ 31. 
84 Id. 
85 See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 20(1). 
86 Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements Given by 
the Accused, ¶ 37. 
87 Id. 
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constitutional defect.88 The Federal Rules of Evidence govern when the 
original statement is considered hearsay.89 The impeachment excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule applies when the original statements were 
obtained in violation of constitutional rights.90 
1. Impeachment by Hearsay Evidence 
 Hearsay, including prior inconsistent statements, is generally in-
admissible for substantive use in U.S. courts.91 Rule 801(d)(1)(A) al-
lows for prior inconsistent statements to be used as substantive evidence 
only when the original statement was given under oath at a prior pro-
ceeding or deposition.92 
 The overriding importance of assessing a witness’s credibility, how-
ever, allows for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements even 
when the original statement is hearsay.93 When live testimony contra-
dicts a witness’s prior statements, counsel on cross-examination has two 
options: (1) directly question the testifying witness as to the prior in-
consistent statement;94 or (2) introduce extrinsic evidence, such as writ-
ten records or another witness, to prove that the testifying witness is 
lying on the stand.95 As impeachment evidence may only be used by the 
factfinder to assess the credibility of a witness, these prior inconsistent 
statements are admitted with a limiting instruction directing the jury as 
to the acceptable uses of these statements.96 
                                                                                                                      
88 See generally Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence 
Manual § 12.01 (M. Bender ed., 1997) (providing a general overview of impeachment 
and rehabilitation of witnesses). 
89 See Fed. R. Evid. 613 & 801(d)(1)(A); see also id. 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”). 
90 See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314 (1990); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 
(1971). 
91 See Fed. R. Evid. 802. 
92 Id. 801(d)(1)(A). 
93 Id. 613. 
94 Id. 613(a). 
95 Id. 613(b). 
96 See United States v. Michelson, 335 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1948). For example, the Third 
Circuit’s model jury instruction states: 
You have heard the testimony of certain witnesses (if only one witness was im-
peached with a prior inconsistent statement, include name of witness). You have also 
heard that before this trial (they)(he)(she) made (statements)(a statement) that 
may be different from (their)(his)(her) testimony in this trial. It is up to you to 
determine whether (these statements were)(this statement was) made and whether 
(they were)(it was) different from the witness(es)’ testimony in this trial. (These 
earlier statements were)(This earlier statement was) brought to your attention only 
 
290 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 31:277 
 In a seminal impeachment case, United States v. Barrett, the defen-
dant was tried for the theft of a valuable stamp collection from the Car-
dinal Spellman Museum.97 At trial, Buzzy Adams, a prosecution witness, 
testified that the defendant had previously admitted to the theft.98 Con-
cerned that Adams was lying to cover his own involvement in the rob-
bery, the defense sought to introduce a second witness, a waitress, who 
overheard Adams state that the defendant had nothing to do with the 
theft.99 The trial judge excluded these inconsistent statements, reason-
ing that the waitress’s testimony was nothing more than a hearsay opin-
ion that the defendant was innocent.100 The First Circuit reversed the 
conviction for failure to admit these inconsistent statements.101 As the 
jury is the “principal judge of the credibility of witnesses,” the purpose 
of prior inconsistent statements is to highlight the “clear incompatibil-
ity” between the statements to the factfinder; thus, it is irrelevant 
whether the testimony is a hearsay opinion.102 
2. Impeachment by Illegally Obtained Evidence 
 At the center of U.S. criminal procedure lies the exclusionary rule, 
which requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of a 
defendant’s constitutional rights.103 Despite the importance of the ex-
clusionary rule, it is a well-established exception—the Harris excep-
tion—that illegally obtained evidence may still be used to impeach a 
defendant’s live testimony.104 This exception reflects a balancing of the 
                                                                                                                      
to help you decide whether to believe the witness(es)’ testimony here at trial. 
You cannot use it as proof of the truth of what the witness(es) said in the ear-
lier statement(s). You can only use it as one way of evaluating the witness(es)’ 
testimony in this trial. 
See Third Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions, § 4.22 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www. 
ca3.uscourts.gov/criminaljury/tocandinstructions.htm. 
97 539 F.2d 244, 245 (1st Cir. 1976). 
98 Id. at 254 n.9. 
99 Id. at 253–54. 
100 Id. at 247. 
101 Id. at 254. 
102 Barrett, 539 F.2d at 254. 
103 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 883, 889 (1914) (finding that a warrantless con-
fiscation of Week’s private letters violated his constitutional rights under Fourth Amend-
ment and, therefore, letters were inadmissible at trial). 
104 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224–26 (1971) (“The shield provided by 
Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from 
the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent statements.”); Walder v. United States, 347 
U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (proclaiming, for the first time, that it would be a perversion of Weeks 
doctrine to allow defendant to “turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Govern-
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need to deter unlawful police conduct with both the law’s interest in 
preventing perjury and the jury’s need to accurately assess a defen-
dant’s credibility.105 
 Harris v. New York held that statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda, although inadmissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, were 
admissible to impeach the defendant’s live testimony.106 Viven Harris 
was tried for twice selling narcotics to an undercover agent.107 Before 
being read his Miranda rights, Harris admitted to police that he made 
both sales and that the second transaction involved heroin.108 At trial, 
Harris changed his story, denying that he made the first sale and stating 
that the second sale was only baking powder.109 The trial court allowed 
the prosecutor to cross-examine Harris by presenting these otherwise 
inadmissible statements.110 
 The Court implicitly reasoned that the “speculative possibility” that 
police misconduct would continue if evidence is used for impeachment 
purposes was vastly outweighed by both the need to prevent perjury and 
the jury’s need to properly assess the defendant’s credibility.111 Police 
would continue to avoid blatant violations of constitutional rights be-
cause this evidence would be banned from the prosecution’s case-in-
chief.112 For these reasons, the Court noted that “there is hardly justifi-
cation for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testi-
mony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credi-
bility.”113 In United States v. Haven, the Court slightly expanded the Harris 
exception to allow illegally obtained evidence to impeach a defendant’s 
answers to the prosecutor’s questions during cross-examination.114 
                                                                                                                      
ment’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield 
against contradictions of his untruths”). 
105 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 (1976); Harris, 401 U.S. at 225; see Mary Jo 
White, The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rule, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 
1476, 1482 (1973). 
106 See 401 U.S. at 226. 
107 Id. at 222–23. 
108 See White, supra note 105, at 1481–82 n.43. 
109 Id. 
110 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 223 (1971). 
111 See id. at 225. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954)); see also United States 
v. Haven, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) (“The incremental furthering of those ends [deter-
rence of illegal police conduct] by forbidding impeachment of the defendant who testifies 
was deemed insufficient to permit or require that false testimony go unchallenged, with 
the resulting impairment of the integrity of the factfinding goals of the criminal trial.”). 
114 See Haven, 446 U.S. at 627–28. 
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 Although the Harris exception allows defendants to be impeached 
by illegally obtained evidence, James v. Illinois held that this evidence 
could not be used to impeach the testimony of all defense witnesses.115 
In James, the prosecution needed to connect the defendant to eyewit-
ness descriptions of a red-headed shooter who left a young boy dead 
and another seriously injured.116 Darryl James, once arrested, admitted 
to dying his hair black and wearing it in its “natural” style, but previ-
ously had red hair worn in a slicked-back “butter” style.117 At trial, a 
friend of the defendant’s family testified that on the day of the shooting 
the defendant’s hair was black and curly.118 The prosecutor unsuccess-
fully sought to use James’s statement to impeach this friend.119 
 The balance, in this case, tipped against the expansion of the Har-
ris exception because allowing the impeachment of all witnesses with 
illegally obtained evidence would encourage the illicit collection of evi-
dence and decrease the accuracy of the factfinding process.120 As wit-
nesses are not substantially invested in a trial, a defendant’s fate should 
not be jeopardized due to a witness’s inattentiveness.121 This extension 
could lead to defense counsel not calling witnesses—who potentially 
may offer probative evidence—for fear that their inattentiveness would 
open the door to illegally obtained evidence.122 
C. Use of Impeachment Evidence in Civil Law Systems 
 In civil law systems, the admissibility of evidence is determined by 
the trial judge, thus obviating the need to codify many rules of evi-
dence.123 Yet the importance of using prior inconsistent statements for 
impeachment purposes has crept into the codes of criminal procedure 
in several nations, including Germany and Poland.124 
                                                                                                                      
115 See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 313 (1990). 
116 Id. at 309–10. 
117 See id. (noting that James’s original statements were suppressed as fruit of an unlaw-
ful arrest because police lacked probable cause for a warrantless arrest). 
118 Id. at 310. 
119 Id. at 320. 
120 James, 493 U.S. at 313–18. For a detailed analysis of the majority and dissent opin-
ions in James, see James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Poli-
cies, Principles, and Politics, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1301, 1312–26 (1992). 
121 James, 493 U.S. at 315. 
122 Id. at 315–16. 
123 See Prosecutor v. Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of 
Statements Given by the Accused, ¶ 36 (Oct. 9, 2006). 
124 See Strafprozeßordnung [StPO] [Code of Criminal Procedure] Apr. 7, 1987, 
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 1054, § 254 (F.R.G), available at http://www.iuscomp. 
org/gla/statutes/StPO.htm (last visited May 13, 2008); Code of Criminal Procedure, June 
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 German evidentiary law allows for judicial records of the accused’s 
previous statements to be read to the court if the accused’s live testi-
mony is contradictory.125 Furthermore, it is the practice of German 
courts to allow a witness’s prior depositions to be read to the court in 
order to highlight inconsistencies.126 
 The Polish Code of Criminal Procedure permits the accused’s 
prior statements given during an investigation or other proceeding to 
be read in court if, at trial, the accused refuses to testify, states that he 
does not remember certain facts, or offers contradictory testimony.127 
Once read to the court, the presiding judge will request that the ac-
cused explain these inconsistencies.128 
III. Analysis 
 To resolve the contradictory results of Mrk»iG and SimiG, this Note 
argues that the ICTY should adopt an international equivalent of the 
United States’ Rule 613 and the Harris exception to the exclusionary 
rule.129 The U.S. approach is clearly compatible with the civil law ap-
proach to admission of evidence, as Germany and Poland already pos-
sess rules allowing impeachment by prior inconsistent statements.130 
Adoption of the U.S. approach would also allow the ICTY to adhere to 
its fundamental evidentiary rules.131 
 According to the Rules, evidence is admissible so long as its proba-
tive value is not outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.132 Im-
peachment by prior inconsistent statements unearths evidence of sub-
stantial probative value regarding the credibility of a witness’s live 
                                                                                                                      
6, 1997, art. 389, §§ 1–2 (Pol.), available at http://www.era.int/domains/corpus-
juris/public_pdf/polish_ccp.pdf (last visited May 12, 2008). 
125 See StPO § 254(2). 
126 See Comparative Criminal Procedure 132 ( John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996). 
127 Code of Criminal Procedure art. 389, § 1. 
128 Id. § 2. 
129 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-91–1, Decision on the Defence Motion on Hear-
say, ¶¶ 15–19 (Aug. 7, 1996), quoted in Boas, supra note 4, at 52. (recognizing that although 
ICTY is not bound by any particular national code of evidence or criminal procedure, the 
Tribunal may seek guidance in rules recognized in other prominent legal systems). 
130 See StPO § 254; Code of Criminal Procedure art. 389, §§ 1–2. 
131 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 89(C)–(D) (General Provisions); see also Prosecu-
tor v. Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements Given by 
the Accused, ¶ 25 (Oct. 9, 2006) (recognizing that while Rules deal with admission of evi-
dence, underlying policies “provide a useful and appropriate guide to the determination 
of the procedure to be followed as to the use of a statement solely for the purposes of 
cross-examination”). 
132 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 89(C)–(D) (General Provisions). 
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testimony.133 Allowing impeachment would also further the ICTY’s com-
mitment to conducting fair trials because fair trials occur only when a 
balance is struck between the need to find the truth and the need to 
preserve the rights of the accused.134 
A. Uncovering the Truth Through the U.S. Approach 
 Impeachment of a witness’s credibility by presentation of prior in-
consistent statements is a vital tool for the factfinder in evaluating the 
evidence presented at trial.135 The value of testimonial evidence de-
pends on a witness’s “opportunity to observe and his capacity to ob-
serve accurately, to remember, and to communicate in such a way that 
triers of fact may know what actually happened.”136 If factfinders are to 
base life-altering decisions on the information communicated by wit-
nesses, it is imperative that they discover whether a witness is worthy of 
their trust.137 
 By presenting the prior inconsistent statements to a witness, the 
prosecutor successfully highlights the “clear incompatibility” between 
the statements to the factfinder.138 Questioning during cross-exam-
ination also affords a witness an opportunity to explain the inconsisten-
cies, proving that the live testimony is truthful and reliable.139 With 
both sides of the story, the factfinder may choose to trust a witness, dis-
credit a witness who is so unreliable as to contradict himself,140 or infer 
that if a witness is mistaken as to one fact, perhaps he is mistaken as to 
other crucial facts.141 
                                                                                                                      
133 See Prosecutor v. Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of 
Statements Given by the Accused, ¶ 31 (Oct. 9, 2006). 
134 See id. ¶ 26 (noting that question is whether probative value of impeachment evi-
dence substantially outweighs need to ensure fair trial); see also Harris v. New York, 401 
U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (concluding that the need to prevent perjury and allow jurors to 
assess credibility outweighed any threat of police misconduct). 
135 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The American Jury System 51 (2003). 
136 Mason Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 Cornell L. 
Rev. 239, 240 (1967). The Advisory Committee relied on this foundational report—
discussing the need for clear evidentiary rules allowing impeachment by prior inconsistent 
statements—when crafting Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 613 advisory commit-
tee’s note. 
137 See Fed. R. Evid. 613 advisory committee’s note; Ladd, supra note 136, at 240. 
138 See United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 254 (1st Cir. 1976). 
139 See Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements 
Given by the Accused, ¶ 32. 
140 Weinstein & Berger, supra note 88, § 12.01[5]. 
141 Id. § 12.01[4]. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, meaning false in one thing, 
false in everything, is a notion deeply rooted in common law jurisprudence. See United States 
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 The SimiG Trial Chamber failed in its role as the principal judge of 
a witness’s credibility when it refused to allow the prosecution to pre-
sent TadiG’s telephone interviews.142 In retrospect, no one will ever 
know whether TadiG’s telephone interviews or live testimony recounted 
an accurate version of the atrocities that occurred in Bosanski Samac.143 
Denying the prosecution the ability to present his prior inconsistent 
statements, however, withheld valuable information regarding TadiG’s 
character and veracity from the Trial Chamber.144 In Mrk»iG, on the 
other hand, the admission of the 1998 statements gave the Trial Cham-
ber the opportunity to evaluate the accused’s credibility and independ-
ently decide whether to credit the live testimony.145 
B. Preserving the Rights of the Accused Through the U.S. Approach 
 Experience under the U.S. approach demonstrates that using 
prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes does not tread 
on the rights of the accused.146 First, restricting the use of prior incon-
sistent statements to impeachment purposes ensures that an accused 
will never be convicted based solely on hearsay or illegally obtained evi-
dence.147 Courts fear that questionable evidence will affect determina-
tions of criminal responsibility by being used to meet the prosecution’s 
burden of proof.148 For example, the Harris Court cautioned that a de-
fendant cannot be convicted based on statements obtained without 
Miranda warnings because the defendant would be unaware of his right 
                                                                                                                      
v. Castillero, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 17, 129 (1862); Siewe v. Gonzalez, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d. Cir. 
2007). 
142 See Prosecutor v. SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s 
Motion to Use Telephone Interviews, ¶ 8 (Mar. 11, 2003); see also Barrett, 539 F.2d at 254 
(finding trial court erred in excluding impeachment evidence because of importance of 
assessing witness’s credibility). 
143 See SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use 
Telephone Interviews, ¶ 2. 
144 See id. ¶ 8. 
145 See Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements 
Given by the Accused, ¶ 33. 
146 Id. ¶ 34. 
147 See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (“[T]he Government cannot 
make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained.”); Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, 
Decision Concerning the Use of Statements Given by the Accused, ¶ 29 (“[T]he Chamber 
would not have allowed the admission of any of these Statements as substantive evidence, 
had the prosecution sought to rely on it.”). 
148 See SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use 
Telephone Interviews, ¶ 8; Kainen, supra note 120, at 1352. 
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to counsel or privilege against self-incrimination.149 The Mrk»iG Trial 
Chamber similarly warned that the accused should not risk conviction 
based on questioning that failed to observe the procedural require-
ments of the Rules.150 
 This proposed international evidence rule leaves the Rules’ proce-
dural safeguards intact while simultaneously allowing prosecutors to 
draw the accused’s inconsistencies to the attention of the Trial Cham-
ber.151 The Harris exception was originally “fashioned to prevent de-
fendants from using unfair trial tactics—lying for their own benefit 
while the Government stood by helplessly, unable to use unconstitu-
tionally obtained probative evidence that could expose the lies.”152 Un-
der U.S. law, the Constitution cannot shield a defendant from his own 
prior statements; similarly, the Rules should no longer be allowed to 
shield the accused as in SimiG.153 
 ICTY judges, through careful drafting, could form a rule that in-
corporates the James limitation, thus adhering to the Rules’ exclusion of 
evidence when its probative value is outweighed by the need to ensure a 
fair trial.154 Rule 613 concludes that any witness may be impeached by 
their own prior statements.155 The James limitation recognizes that a de-
fendant’s statements can only impeach the declarant defendant, not 
other witnesses.156 The normative basis of these two propositions is that 
a witness should always be aware of his or her own prior statements.157 
As recognized by the James Court, cross-examination of a witness by ref-
                                                                                                                      
149 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (“Miranda barred the prosecution 
from making its case with statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having 
or effectively waiving counsel. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible 
against an accused in the prosecution’s case in chief is barred for all purposes.”). 
150 See Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements 
Given by the Accused, ¶ 29. 
151 See Mrk»iG Brief for the Prosecution, supra note 34, ¶ 10. 
152 White, supra note 105, at 1497. 
153 See Harris, 401 U.S. at 226. 
154 See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1990); see also R. P. & Evid., supra note 
16, at 89(D) (General Provisions) (guiding Trial Chambers to exclude evidence if neces-
sary to hold fair trial). 
155 Fed. R. Evid. 613. 
156 493 U.S. at 315–16. 
157 See Fed. R. Evid. 613 advisory committee’s note. The common law rule regarding 
impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, derived from The Queen’s Case, 2 Br. & B. 
284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820), required a witness to be shown a written account of the 
alleged prior inconsistent statement before counsel could cross-examine regarding the 
inconsistencies. In Rule 613, the drafters did away with this requirement, implicitly reason-
ing that witnesses should be aware of their own prior statements and need not be shown 
the statement in advance. See id. 
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erence to another person’s statements is unlikely to reveal information 
of significant probative value.158 This type of cross-examination, there-
fore, would be excluded not just under James, but under the ICTY’s cur-
rent Rules.159 
 Additionally, trial before a professional factfinder ensures that the 
accused will not be convicted due to overvaluation of impeachment 
evidence.160 Because of the overriding importance of discovering the 
truth, U.S. courts allow for impeachment by prior inconsistent state-
ments despite the potential overvaluing of this information by lay ju-
ries.161 Jurors’ ability to confine evidence to its proper scope, even with 
a limiting instruction, has been called an “unmitigated fiction”162 and 
an impossible feat of “mental gymnastics.”163 Empirical studies confirm 
that jurors are often unable to follow instructions limiting the use of 
evidence to a particular purpose.164 
 The ICTY has a stronger incentive to adopt a rule permitting im-
peachment of witnesses by prior inconsistent statements because pro-
fessional judges possess the requisite knowledge to afford only the 
proper weight to hearsay or illegally obtained evidence.165 Scholars 
                                                                                                                      
158 See James, 493 U.S. at 320. 
159 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 89(C)–(D) (General Provisions). 
160 See Boas, supra note 4, at 55. 
161 See White, supra note 105, at 1476–77. 
162 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) ( Jackson, J., concurring). 
163 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); see also Kainen, supra note 
120, at 1352 (noting that courts expect jurors not to “consider any of the affirmative infer-
ences from the perjury that would relieve the prosecution from establishing its burden of 
proving guilt with lawful evidence”). 
164 See Jonakait, supra note 135, at 202–05. A preeminent study looked at whether ju-
rors obeyed instructions limiting the use of prior conviction evidence to impeachment 
purposes as required by Rule 609. When jurors did not receive information regarding 
prior convictions, 42.5% voted to convict. Jurors were then presented with evidence of 
prior convictions for similar offenses, prior convictions for dissimilar offenses, and prior 
perjury convictions. Even though jurors were given a limiting instruction, conviction rates 
skyrocketed to 75.0%, 52.5%, and 60.0% respectively. Researchers concluded that presen-
tation of prior convictions “increase[s] the likelihood of conviction, and that the judge’s 
limiting instructions do not appear to correct that error.” See Roselle L. Wissler & Michael 
Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instruction: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide 
on Guilt, 9 L. & Hum. Behav. 37, 43, & 47 (1985). 
165 See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty 
of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1319–21 (2005). One study found that 
judges in bench trials were able to disregard coerced confessions obtained in violation of 
Miranda’s guarantee of a right to counsel. When judges were not told about the defen-
dant’s coerced confession, 17.7% convicted the defendant. When judges were told about 
the defendant’s coerced confession, just 20.7% chose to convict the defendant. Research-
ers concluded that “judges were able to uphold the policies underlying the Miranda doc-
trine and ignore incriminating but inadmissible evidence.” Id. 
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have noted that the presence of professional factfinders is precisely the 
reason why hearsay and other troublesome evidence are admissible be-
fore the ICTY.166 Quite simply, ICTY trials are “unencumbered by the 
usual concern of unduly prejudicing non-judicial minds in the trying of 
criminal cases.”167 Admission of impeachment evidence, therefore, is 
warranted at the ICTY because it would give the judge a better under-
standing of the witness’s credibility without the risk of the evidence be-
ing used substantively.168 
 Third, the explicit exclusion of illegally obtained statements from 
the prosecution’s case-in-chief ensures that prosecutors respect the 
procedural guidelines of the Rules.169 The SimiG Trial Chamber’s fear 
that admission of prior statements would “condone” violation of the 
rules was allayed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris.170 There, the 
Court noted sufficient deterrence of police misconduct stems from the 
exclusion of these illegally obtained statements from substantive use.171 
Essentially, there is no incentive to violate procedural and constitu-
tional guidelines if the evidence cannot be used at trial.172 Even less 
incentive exists in ICTY cases because investigations are directed en-
tirely by prosecutors because the ICTY has no law enforcement 
branch.173 Prosecutors, therefore, will have an even greater apprecia-
tion for the risks of violating the Rules because of the detrimental effect 
on their own cases.174 
 Finally, potential impeachment by prior inconsistent statements 
does not interfere with the free exercise of the accused’s right to testify 
in his own defense—a fear of the SimiG Trial Chamber.175 This right is 
guaranteed under both the Rules and U.S. law.176 Impeachment simply 
                                                                                                                      
166 See Boas, supra note 4, at 55; see also May & Wierda, supra note 17, at 747 (explaining 
that ICTY judges are able to hear hearsay and other controversial evidence in context in 
which it was obtained and afford it proper weight). 
167 Boas, supra note 4, at 55. 
168 See id. 
169 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
170 See id.; Prosecutor v. SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecu-
tion’s Motion to Use Telephone Interviews, ¶ 8 (Mar. 11, 2003). 
171 See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. 
172 See id. (explicitly reasoning that “sufficient deterrence follows when the evidence in 
question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief”). 
173 Carla Del Ponte, Investigation and Prosecution of Large-Scale Crimes at the International 
Level: The Experience of the ICTY, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 539, 552 (2006). 
174 See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. 
175 See SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Motion to Use 
Telephone Interviews, ¶ 7. 
176 R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 85(C) (General Provisions); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 273 (1948) (expounding that “[a] person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge 
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ensures that when the accused elects to testify, he or she speaks truth-
fully.177 Essentially, this right to testify “cannot be construed to include 
the right to commit perjury.”178 
C. Practical Benefits of the U.S. Approach 
 In ICTY trials, the lack of contemporaneous evidence presents a 
tactical problem for prosecutors.179 Contemporaneous evidence carries 
more weight at trial because it was obtained or recorded while the 
criminal events were transpiring.180 Adoption of the U.S. approach to 
prior inconsistent statements would take prosecutors one step closer to 
overcoming this evidentiary hurdle.181 
 Most crimes being tried before the ICTY occurred before the ICTY 
was even established; therefore, prosecutors are faced with piecing to-
gether evidence years after the crimes occurred.182 Wiretapping and 
surveillance—which are two of the most common investigatory tools— 
are unavailable to ICTY prosecutors.183 Documentary evidence is also 
scarce because, as one former ICTY prosecutor noted, “Senior leaders 
orchestrating large-scale crimes rarely document the overall criminal 
purpose or detail each criminal step of its implementation.”184 
 In the absence of these fact-gathering tools, live testimony is the 
primary tool for presenting facts to the Trial Chamber.185 As the value 
of testimonial evidence depends on a witness’s ability to remember and 
relate certain events, the prosecutor should be able to check the accu-
                                                                                                                      
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—
are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to 
examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel”). 
177 See R. P. & Evid., supra note 16, at 90(A) (Testimony of Witnesses) (requiring that 
all witnesses abide by the oath and solemn declaration: “I solemnly declare that I will speak 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”). 
178 Harris, 401 U.S. at 225. 
179 Del Ponte, supra note 173, at 553–55. 
180 Cf. Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420 (1994) (discussing value of contemporaneous 
evidence in questions of statutory interpretation). 
181 See Fed. R. Evid. 613; Harris, 401 U.S. at 226. 
182 Del Ponte, supra note 173, at 551–52. 
183 See id. at 552; see also Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Report of the Director 
of the Administrative Office of United States Courts on Applications for Orders 
Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, Oral, or Electronic Commu-
nications 5 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/wiretap05/WTText.pdf (noting 
that in 2005, 1773 wiretap applications were authorized in the United States). 
184 Del Ponte, supra note 173, at 553. 
185 See id. at 551–53 (implicitly recognizing that, in the absence of wiretapping, surveil-
lance, and documentary evidence, the primary source of information remaining is live 
witnesses). 
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racy of trial testimony against statements given closer in time to the un-
derlying event.186 For example, the SimiG case involved alleged crimes 
occurring between September 1991 and December 1993.187 The tele-
phone interviews at issue were conducted in 1996.188 TadiG’s trial testi-
mony, however, did not take place until 2003.189 Because of the frailty of 
human memory, statements given two years after an event are more 
credible than statements given ten years after an event.190 Even though 
prior statements may not be used substantively, assessment of a witness’s 
credibility is crucial in the factfinder’s evaluation of testimonial evi-
dence.191 
 The absence of detailed evidentiary rules, moreover, leaves prose-
cutors guessing as to which pieces of their limited evidentiary arsenal 
can be used at trial.192 Each Trial Chamber is allowed to independently 
“apply the procedure according to its own understanding of the pur-
pose and underlying principles of the procedure.”193 As previously dis-
cussed, the U.S. approach is consistent with the ICTY’s principles gov-
erning the admissibility of evidence, namely that evidence is admissible 
so long as its probative value is not outweighed by the need to ensure a 
fair trial.194 Codification of a clear rule regarding prior inconsistent 
statements would prevent conflicting interpretations of policy and pro-
vide concrete guidelines for prosecutors.195 
 As the ICTY seeks to provide expeditious trials, adoption of the 
U.S. approach would obviate the need for case-by-case evidentiary deci-
                                                                                                                      
186 See Ladd, supra note 136, at 240; see also Prosecutor v. Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, 
Decision Concerning the Use of Statements Given by the Accused, ¶ 28 (Oct. 9, 2006) 
(noting extensive time delay between challenged statements and trial testimony of accused 
can extend up to fifteen years). 
187 SimiG Fifth Amended Indictment, supra note 52, ¶ 11. 
188 Prosecutor v. SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Mo-
tion to Use Telephone Interviews, ¶ 2 (Mar. 11, 2003). 
189 Id. 
190 See generally Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 Psychol. R. 
403, 418 (2003) (finding that memories of events change over time and, as time passes, 
individuals will likely perceive events in abstract features, not concrete details). 
191 Mrk»iG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements Given 
by the Accused, ¶ 33. 
192 See Patrick L. Robinson, Rough Edges in the Alignment of the Legal Systems in the Proceed-
ings at the ICTY, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1037, 1056–57 (2005). 
193 Id. at 1057. 
194 See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. 
195 Compare MrkšiG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements 
Given by the Accused, ¶ 33 (allowing prior inconsistent statements to be used for im-
peachment), with Prosecutor v. SimiG, Case No. IT-95–9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prose-
cution’s Motion to Use Telephone Interviews, ¶ 8 (Mar. 11, 2003) (disallowing prior in-
consistent statements to be used for impeachment). 
2008] Prior Inconsistent Statements Impeachment Before the ICTY 301 
sions and speed up the pace of war crimes trials.196 In Mrk»iG, for exam-
ple, the trial was delayed for a month because the Trial Chamber 
needed to decide whether the 1998 statements were admissible.197 
Conclusion 
 International criminal tribunals are bound to play an increasingly 
important role in the future. The need to establish clear functional 
rules of evidence is paramount to ensuring that these criminal trials 
remain fair proceedings for both the prosecution and defense. Cur-
rently, the ICTY’s Rules, with all their virtues and flaws, have been virtu-
ally duplicated by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and 
the International Criminal Court. As a result, the debate regarding the 
use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes will 
remain part of the international legal landscape until one tribunal ends 
the debate by establishing a clear evidentiary rule allowing the admis-
sion of these statements. 
 The ICTY, as the original international criminal tribunal, stands in 
a position to remedy this problem, once and for all, by adopting an in-
ternational equivalent to Rule 613 and the Harris exception. The Trial 
Chambers have already accepted the logic underlying the U.S. eviden-
tiary rule. Now it is time for the ICTY to explicitly adopt a similar rule 
and prevent future witnesses from weaving a web of lies on the stand. 
                                                                                                                      
196 See, e.g., MrkšiG, Case No. IT-95–13/1-T, Decision Concerning the Use of Statements 
Given by the Accused, ¶ 33. 
197 Id. The defense filed a motion requesting the exclusion of the 1998 statements on 
September 7, 2006. The Trial Chamber did not resolve the issue until October 9, 2006. Id. 
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